Reading Fanon and Joyce in tandem this week brought up a particular issue that surfaces in the other texts we have studied: the importance of beauty in language, and the relation of the colonised (as a "tourist" of sorts of the coloniser's language) to beauty.
In a rather unfair exchange (among many others), the coloniser aestheticises the Other as a means of adding beauty to the English language and as a means of creating beauty. I'm thinking of Said and Gikandi here - the selective use of material or pseudo-spiritual aspects of the East/Other to make art. There's a hint of this in Joyce as well, when yellow ivy makes Stephen think of ivory: "one of the first examples that he had learnt in Latin had run: India mittit ebur" (157). India sends ivory: the coloniser's language is the medium that makes aspects of the East - the romanticised image of India, the material of ivory - beautiful. The coloniser is thus placed in the powerful position of the artist.
However, I call this exchange unfair because the colonised is barred from reciprocating. The privilege of the artist does not extend to the colonised, and this is very evident in Fanon's description of the French talking down to the native, even if the native is fluent in French: language to the native must be fragmented and thus made unbeautiful (for the native, language can only serve as a means of communication and the coloniser's assertion of power). The native is thus barred from the realm of the aesthetic and kept from creating beauty in language, because the notion of beauty, as with language, comes with an accompanying world of cultural knowledge and tradition (as Fanon and Joyce describe). The coloniser-artist feels more and more threatened the closer the native comes to this hallowed world. For the colonised, however, the problem lies in how to access beauty without resorting to this cultural world of the coloniser; Stephen, for instance, cannot enunciate an aesthetics of beauty without thinking through the borrowed lens of Aquinas. The colonised can thus try to reclaim this coloniser's cultural notions of beauty for his own, or he can rewrite his own standards of beauty.
I argue that the latter is what Joyce does in Portrait. By placing Irish Stephen in the role of artist, he reclaims agency for the colonised to act as a creator of beauty, as Joyce himself does through his modernist play with language. Rejecting the hermetic line of beauty, as it were, of the omniscient authorial voice, he revels in fragmentation, showing how fragmented language can be beautiful - contrary to the French in Fanon. Joyce, therefore, enacts a reversal of the talking-down and deaestheticization of language that goes on in Fanon; this is, arguably, an excellent example of how the colonised artist can reclaim beauty for himself.
Showing posts with label andrea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label andrea. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
Wednesday, November 5, 2008
The reality of language
Ireland's position as a site of divided identity, as Jackson suggests, lies partly in "the failure of the British to define Ireland either in fully metropolitan or colonial terms" (150). Definitions, and language as the key means of definition, are thus invariably tied to the shaping of identity and one's reality.
This is something that struck me very much about Joyce (and perhaps it is true of modernism in general as well): words are as much political as they are aesthetic. Like Orwell, Joyce seems to espouse a form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: the language you use defines your reality, which in turn defines and restricts your language. Stephen's formative years are matched and reflected by the literal formation of language and its semantic possibilities. As a boy, meanings are multiple and malleable, reflecting the tabula rasa state of his mind: "What did that mean, to kiss?" (11-12); "God was God's name just as his name was Stephen. Dieu was the French for God and that was God's name too" (13). Meanings, however, become restricted by social conventions, as shown by the coding in colours and language that Stephen learns. The lexical item "green rose" must be rejected because "you could not have a green rose" (9). Green (and maroon) become associated with the political reality of Ireland - green for Parnell, maroon for Davitt. In this way the rejection of the "green rose" becomes more subversively diabolical: you can have red or white roses, York and Lancaster, but to map Irish green to a British symbol is denied by linguistic and "realistic" (insofar as the real is shaped by language and society) conventions.
The effect of language on the state of of being colonised is thus highly complex: if a person is brought up in the capacity of a colonised man, how does one separate what this reality imposes on him as opposed to the reality that is his and that he can shape? How does Ireland (or India, or other colonies) define its reality when it is caught in a linguistic and real-world "halfway house" (to quote Jackson)? Language is slippery; so is reality and identity. Joyce emphasises this with his use of language, which slips and slides, fractures and builds, to create a sense of the "real": Stephen's burgeoning consciousness, matched and mapped by the reader's own consciousness in the reading experience. And yet, in line with Joyce's own identity as Irish (reflected and shaped by this characteristic of his language), shadowing it all is a constant questioning of the "real" that he builds and its relation with the "master language" of English: "How different are the words home, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or write these words without unrest of spirit...my soul frets in the shadow of his language." (167)
This is something that struck me very much about Joyce (and perhaps it is true of modernism in general as well): words are as much political as they are aesthetic. Like Orwell, Joyce seems to espouse a form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: the language you use defines your reality, which in turn defines and restricts your language. Stephen's formative years are matched and reflected by the literal formation of language and its semantic possibilities. As a boy, meanings are multiple and malleable, reflecting the tabula rasa state of his mind: "What did that mean, to kiss?" (11-12); "God was God's name just as his name was Stephen. Dieu was the French for God and that was God's name too" (13). Meanings, however, become restricted by social conventions, as shown by the coding in colours and language that Stephen learns. The lexical item "green rose" must be rejected because "you could not have a green rose" (9). Green (and maroon) become associated with the political reality of Ireland - green for Parnell, maroon for Davitt. In this way the rejection of the "green rose" becomes more subversively diabolical: you can have red or white roses, York and Lancaster, but to map Irish green to a British symbol is denied by linguistic and "realistic" (insofar as the real is shaped by language and society) conventions.
The effect of language on the state of of being colonised is thus highly complex: if a person is brought up in the capacity of a colonised man, how does one separate what this reality imposes on him as opposed to the reality that is his and that he can shape? How does Ireland (or India, or other colonies) define its reality when it is caught in a linguistic and real-world "halfway house" (to quote Jackson)? Language is slippery; so is reality and identity. Joyce emphasises this with his use of language, which slips and slides, fractures and builds, to create a sense of the "real": Stephen's burgeoning consciousness, matched and mapped by the reader's own consciousness in the reading experience. And yet, in line with Joyce's own identity as Irish (reflected and shaped by this characteristic of his language), shadowing it all is a constant questioning of the "real" that he builds and its relation with the "master language" of English: "How different are the words home, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or write these words without unrest of spirit...my soul frets in the shadow of his language." (167)
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Writing the white self by censoring sex
I found Stoler’s observation that the later stages of colonialism were accompanied by the increasing need to build a “cordon sanitaire” (77) around whiteness and white prestige very interesting. This seems to be paralleled in the tension I find in Orwell and Woolf, which arises, I feel, between the growing awareness of empire’s complexity on one hand and the anxiety of self – the need to inscribe one’s identity within protective whiteness – on the other.
This tension is reflected in the Orwell and Woolf texts, which claim to be autobiographical but which are carefully – whether consciously or not – crafted to project a certain image of the self. What struck me in particular about Woolf was how he constantly drew on symbols of whiteness to shape his discourse. The people and events he writes about are compared to (and therefore understood through) fictional discourses from Austen, Kipling, Forster, Don Quixote; his autobiographical account is based not just on personal recollections but on letters exchanged with Lytton Strachey in England. One has to be in dialogue and contact with Englishness/whiteness in order to express the self. And in order to project a self that is acceptable to standards of whiteness (as Woolf himself performs to the Club and to the natives), Woolf and Orwell’s accounts of the self also undergo some form of self-censorship. As noted in other posts, women are curiously absent in texts by both authors; attempts at portraying (white) women are sanitized and desexualized – a symptom of the prescribed moral and sexual roles that Stoler identifies.
Arguably, sexuality in colonialism is essential but veiled (by symbolism or other forms of discourse and power relations) because sex is disarming in its physicality and visceral nature. This is somewhat similar to Woolf’s epiphany that when faced with simple, sensory contact with his beloved animals, “they make nonsense of all philosophies and religions” (101) [though Woolf seems to have a disturbing tendency to place more importance on his pets than on the natives!]. Hence, the power of sexuality and sex to challenge imposed boundaries (physically manifested in the metis children of mixed blood) explains why they were gradually censored from the discourse of whiteness.
This tension is reflected in the Orwell and Woolf texts, which claim to be autobiographical but which are carefully – whether consciously or not – crafted to project a certain image of the self. What struck me in particular about Woolf was how he constantly drew on symbols of whiteness to shape his discourse. The people and events he writes about are compared to (and therefore understood through) fictional discourses from Austen, Kipling, Forster, Don Quixote; his autobiographical account is based not just on personal recollections but on letters exchanged with Lytton Strachey in England. One has to be in dialogue and contact with Englishness/whiteness in order to express the self. And in order to project a self that is acceptable to standards of whiteness (as Woolf himself performs to the Club and to the natives), Woolf and Orwell’s accounts of the self also undergo some form of self-censorship. As noted in other posts, women are curiously absent in texts by both authors; attempts at portraying (white) women are sanitized and desexualized – a symptom of the prescribed moral and sexual roles that Stoler identifies.
Arguably, sexuality in colonialism is essential but veiled (by symbolism or other forms of discourse and power relations) because sex is disarming in its physicality and visceral nature. This is somewhat similar to Woolf’s epiphany that when faced with simple, sensory contact with his beloved animals, “they make nonsense of all philosophies and religions” (101) [though Woolf seems to have a disturbing tendency to place more importance on his pets than on the natives!]. Hence, the power of sexuality and sex to challenge imposed boundaries (physically manifested in the metis children of mixed blood) explains why they were gradually censored from the discourse of whiteness.
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
Milieu, infection and colonial health
Stoler quotes Paul Rainbow’s argument that “the concern about milieu permeating French colonial thinking on education, health, labor, and sex in the late nineteenth century can only be understood in terms of the scientific episteme on which it relied” (535). This stood out for me for two reasons: the notion of milieu that Stoler discusses several times in the reading, and the “episteme”/metaphor of infection that permeates colonial discourse.
On one level, the colony is presented as a source of infection for the metropolitan centre in terms of physical health. Contemporary medical accounts warned of health dangers to Europeans who “stayed in the tropics too long” (Stoler 536); this is reflected in Burmese Days with Flory’s illness that “finished” his youth (68) and the creepy doctor who measured Marlow’s cranium in Heart of Darkness. Infection also carries to another level of heritage and blood, hence the anxiety over metis (literally mixed blood) that Stoler examines.
Besides carrying uncomfortable overtones of feudalism (where the right to rule is carried in the blood/endowed by superior divine force), this literal, quasi-empirical way of looking at the effect of the colony on the colonizer is problematic for me because of how it subsequently becomes a metaphor and epistemological mode that shapes the discourse and perception of colonizer and colonized alike. Imperialism becomes, in every sense of the word, a malaise that plagues colonial relations and thought: notice how for Flory “what poisoned everything…was the ever bitterer hatred of the atmosphere of imperialism in which he lived” (Orwell 68). The framework of infection shapes the milieu in which colonialism functions and the colonizer’s response: preventing infection by purifying the milieu/environment, as Flory does by replacing the source of infection (May) with the totem of the pure white woman. This is partly why the portrayal of both women in Orwell’s text (barring the complications of authorial irony) disturbs me on an instinctive level.
On one level, the colony is presented as a source of infection for the metropolitan centre in terms of physical health. Contemporary medical accounts warned of health dangers to Europeans who “stayed in the tropics too long” (Stoler 536); this is reflected in Burmese Days with Flory’s illness that “finished” his youth (68) and the creepy doctor who measured Marlow’s cranium in Heart of Darkness. Infection also carries to another level of heritage and blood, hence the anxiety over metis (literally mixed blood) that Stoler examines.
Besides carrying uncomfortable overtones of feudalism (where the right to rule is carried in the blood/endowed by superior divine force), this literal, quasi-empirical way of looking at the effect of the colony on the colonizer is problematic for me because of how it subsequently becomes a metaphor and epistemological mode that shapes the discourse and perception of colonizer and colonized alike. Imperialism becomes, in every sense of the word, a malaise that plagues colonial relations and thought: notice how for Flory “what poisoned everything…was the ever bitterer hatred of the atmosphere of imperialism in which he lived” (Orwell 68). The framework of infection shapes the milieu in which colonialism functions and the colonizer’s response: preventing infection by purifying the milieu/environment, as Flory does by replacing the source of infection (May) with the totem of the pure white woman. This is partly why the portrayal of both women in Orwell’s text (barring the complications of authorial irony) disturbs me on an instinctive level.
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
(Birth)marks, representality, “beastly” Art
As has been mentioned in many of the posts, I found it interesting that Orwell is deliberately reductive – he emphasizes the exterior, stereotypes, literary tropes – in Burmese Days. On one hand, this leads to some skilful puncturing of tired images and words in two of Orwell’s biggest concerns: contemporary English writing and the colonial project in general. For example, I found the description of Verrall rather hilarious: the emphasis of his “gleam[ing]” whiteness and martial appearance on a horse evokes the quintessentially British image of St George, but is subverted by his spear being “like a needle in his hand” and his resemblance to “a rabbit, perhaps, but a tough and martial rabbit”.
On the other hand, the notion of quintessence and representality in art is a vexed issue throughout Orwell’s text. Flory’s birthmark is both a literal mark of Cain and a physical, symbolic aspect of himself that his self struggles with constantly. Significantly, it is the only part of him that Elizabeth remembers after their estrangement, while it fades to a “faint grey stain” only after his death. A project, whether artistic or colonial, that tries to essentialize things in their representation is both inevitable and necessarily flawed.
But this creates a dilemma for the artist, who fundamentally traffics in representation: how is one to make art then? Orwell satirizes this dilemma in Flory and Elizabeth’s exchange on the pwe dance. Elizabeth’s dismissal of “the hated word Art” is juxtaposed against Flory the consummate artist (and proto-Orwell), who looks for the ‘higher’ values in objects and life; for him, “the whole life and spirit of Burma is summed up in the way [the dancer] twists her arms”. But as we see in Shooting an Elephant and Burmese Days, representation is much more complex than that for Orwell, particularly when it comes to representing the native – perhaps why he resorts to stereotypes. What then are we to make of his rounded, sympathetic portrayal of Flory and the narrator in Shooting – is it really an attempt at revising representality or does Orwell have other objectives in mind (since it’s a lost cause anyway)?
On the other hand, the notion of quintessence and representality in art is a vexed issue throughout Orwell’s text. Flory’s birthmark is both a literal mark of Cain and a physical, symbolic aspect of himself that his self struggles with constantly. Significantly, it is the only part of him that Elizabeth remembers after their estrangement, while it fades to a “faint grey stain” only after his death. A project, whether artistic or colonial, that tries to essentialize things in their representation is both inevitable and necessarily flawed.
But this creates a dilemma for the artist, who fundamentally traffics in representation: how is one to make art then? Orwell satirizes this dilemma in Flory and Elizabeth’s exchange on the pwe dance. Elizabeth’s dismissal of “the hated word Art” is juxtaposed against Flory the consummate artist (and proto-Orwell), who looks for the ‘higher’ values in objects and life; for him, “the whole life and spirit of Burma is summed up in the way [the dancer] twists her arms”. But as we see in Shooting an Elephant and Burmese Days, representation is much more complex than that for Orwell, particularly when it comes to representing the native – perhaps why he resorts to stereotypes. What then are we to make of his rounded, sympathetic portrayal of Flory and the narrator in Shooting – is it really an attempt at revising representality or does Orwell have other objectives in mind (since it’s a lost cause anyway)?
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Framed: the problem with "discursive frameworks"
Aptly enough, the Chatterjee article enacts what it advocates: switching perspectives on colonialism (with a confidence in its agency to do so that we don’t see in Achebe and Fanon) in order to gain new insights into how our perceived reality is dictated by subjective cognitive frameworks.
One such schema is ideology. Chatterjee demonstrates how the meaning of ‘-isms’ – he mainly mentions three: imperialism, capitalism, modernity – can morph according to who defines them. Chatterjee has an invested interest in how these three relate to each other because he writes from the framework of Indian nationalism himself: for example, defining imperialism in terms of capitalism rather than civilizing/power terms calls to mind the Leninist definition of imperialism as “the highest stage of capitalism”. The subsequent implication that history progresses in stages (as Marxists argue) strengthens the claim that colonialism is but one stage in India’s history. Frameworks, therefore, shape thought and reality. In Shooting an Elephant, colonial rule manifests itself in frameworks of colonial difference: reference is made to a “Dravidian coolie”, which alludes to (outdated) 19th-century anthropology’s method of classifying race by language families; the narrator’s actions are made “legally…right” by British-imposed law.
However, Chatterjee works on the assumption that one has the power to change one’s framework. Shooting problematises this: cognitive frameworks can be deeply ingrained and might clash. The narrator (like Orwell himself) feels conflicted because he tries to espouse a liberal, anti-imperialist stance but his identity schema as a British officer simultaneously implicates certain views of the colonial subject. There is also the question of how liberating switching frameworks can really be – nationalism and Chatterjee’s conception of indigenous history all seem to fit Western epistemological moulds.
And while Chatterjee and Orwell work in counterpoint showing how frameworks can help shape/ossify reality, there still seems to be something lacking – maybe because language itself is a framework of sorts. Orwell said that “good prose is like a windowpane”, but ultimately a barrier of glass remains, separating window-frame from messy reality.
One such schema is ideology. Chatterjee demonstrates how the meaning of ‘-isms’ – he mainly mentions three: imperialism, capitalism, modernity – can morph according to who defines them. Chatterjee has an invested interest in how these three relate to each other because he writes from the framework of Indian nationalism himself: for example, defining imperialism in terms of capitalism rather than civilizing/power terms calls to mind the Leninist definition of imperialism as “the highest stage of capitalism”. The subsequent implication that history progresses in stages (as Marxists argue) strengthens the claim that colonialism is but one stage in India’s history. Frameworks, therefore, shape thought and reality. In Shooting an Elephant, colonial rule manifests itself in frameworks of colonial difference: reference is made to a “Dravidian coolie”, which alludes to (outdated) 19th-century anthropology’s method of classifying race by language families; the narrator’s actions are made “legally…right” by British-imposed law.
However, Chatterjee works on the assumption that one has the power to change one’s framework. Shooting problematises this: cognitive frameworks can be deeply ingrained and might clash. The narrator (like Orwell himself) feels conflicted because he tries to espouse a liberal, anti-imperialist stance but his identity schema as a British officer simultaneously implicates certain views of the colonial subject. There is also the question of how liberating switching frameworks can really be – nationalism and Chatterjee’s conception of indigenous history all seem to fit Western epistemological moulds.
And while Chatterjee and Orwell work in counterpoint showing how frameworks can help shape/ossify reality, there still seems to be something lacking – maybe because language itself is a framework of sorts. Orwell said that “good prose is like a windowpane”, but ultimately a barrier of glass remains, separating window-frame from messy reality.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
A blending of frames: Jim as episteme and epistemological mystery
I found Lord Jim interesting in the way it seemed to bridge literary genres and modes of knowing: on one hand, Jim’s story, taken alone, seems to fit the structure of a Romantic bildungsroman (indeed, Lord Jim is sometimes subtitled A Romance) following the rise and fall of a hero figure. At the same time, this linear narrative is fractured by the text’s layered structure and Citizen Kane-style drifting between sub-narratives and voices, as filtered through Marlow – Conrad’s modernist aspect, so to speak.
Conrad’s amalgamation of modernist forms and earlier literary genres works on many levels. It can be read as representing the conflict at the heart of the colonial project, which seeks to fit itself within an ordered grand narrative that somewhat mirrors the bildungsroman (bringing knowledge to the uncivilized, encouraging the progress and growth of man – both coloniser and colonized). This is continually defeated, however, by reality in its many facets, which breaks up this imposed narrative into the grey areas that we have seen in the texts studied so far.
This is linked to the fundamental unknowability of things, which is the question that Marlow and the novel itself grapple with. Jim remains an epistemological mystery (as both subject and object) despite his heroic trajectory – which, ironically, is triggered by a failure of knowledge: Jim thinks he knows the outcome of the Patna, but its reality eludes him. Marlow and the other characters’ fascination with Jim, Marlow’s attempts to steer the course of Jim’s life, and his attempts to frame Jim’s story in various forms of narratives, echoes our fascination with the text: he/it evades our frames of knowledge, and we try to make sense of him/it but never really succeed because he/it cannot fit within a prescribed framework (or genre) of knowing.
296 words
Conrad’s amalgamation of modernist forms and earlier literary genres works on many levels. It can be read as representing the conflict at the heart of the colonial project, which seeks to fit itself within an ordered grand narrative that somewhat mirrors the bildungsroman (bringing knowledge to the uncivilized, encouraging the progress and growth of man – both coloniser and colonized). This is continually defeated, however, by reality in its many facets, which breaks up this imposed narrative into the grey areas that we have seen in the texts studied so far.
This is linked to the fundamental unknowability of things, which is the question that Marlow and the novel itself grapple with. Jim remains an epistemological mystery (as both subject and object) despite his heroic trajectory – which, ironically, is triggered by a failure of knowledge: Jim thinks he knows the outcome of the Patna, but its reality eludes him. Marlow and the other characters’ fascination with Jim, Marlow’s attempts to steer the course of Jim’s life, and his attempts to frame Jim’s story in various forms of narratives, echoes our fascination with the text: he/it evades our frames of knowledge, and we try to make sense of him/it but never really succeed because he/it cannot fit within a prescribed framework (or genre) of knowing.
296 words
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
The heart of art lies outside itself
Read in relation to each other, the question that arises from both texts appears to be a metaphysical one: is there an essence to art that can be disentangled from its author, its setting, its shameful racist tendencies (or insert authorial vice)? This is paralled, perhaps, by Heart of Darkness’ question of whether there is an essence to man, released from the trappings of society.
Achebe says that because Heart cannot be untangled from its “bloody racist” author, it should not be considered art as such. For Marlowe, while Kurtz was “remarkable” for having “stepped over the edge”, man is perhaps better off trammeled by society.
But another answer to the original question (and one that I am more inclined towards) seems to present itself in the embedded structure of Heart itself. Marlow is both teller and part of the narrative, as is the shadowy “I”, as is Conrad himself. The effacing of authorial voice and the intentional similarities between Marlowe and Conrad just makes it all the more ambiguous to pin the text down to a unitary narrative. Similarly, Heart should be read not just as itself but as part of a body of narratives that grows with time: part of colonial discourse, part of the postcolonial reaction (by Achebe, for instance), part of modernism and so on. Perhaps then a work of art lies not in its essence but in how it can be taken out of itself to generate more fruitful narratives.
This quote from Heart seems particularly relevant: “to [Marlow] the meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze…” (18)
283 words
ps. As a point of interest, there’s a slight parallel between Achebe’s criticism of Conrad and the recent decision by Britain’s exam board to ban a poem on knife crime by Carol Ann Duffy from the GCSE syllabus. Duffy’s riposte, in the form of a poem, also brings out a drawback to Achebe’s argument: where does one draw the line, since every author in history can probably be accused of being close-minded (and thus culpable of violence) in some way?
Achebe says that because Heart cannot be untangled from its “bloody racist” author, it should not be considered art as such. For Marlowe, while Kurtz was “remarkable” for having “stepped over the edge”, man is perhaps better off trammeled by society.
But another answer to the original question (and one that I am more inclined towards) seems to present itself in the embedded structure of Heart itself. Marlow is both teller and part of the narrative, as is the shadowy “I”, as is Conrad himself. The effacing of authorial voice and the intentional similarities between Marlowe and Conrad just makes it all the more ambiguous to pin the text down to a unitary narrative. Similarly, Heart should be read not just as itself but as part of a body of narratives that grows with time: part of colonial discourse, part of the postcolonial reaction (by Achebe, for instance), part of modernism and so on. Perhaps then a work of art lies not in its essence but in how it can be taken out of itself to generate more fruitful narratives.
This quote from Heart seems particularly relevant: “to [Marlow] the meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze…” (18)
283 words
ps. As a point of interest, there’s a slight parallel between Achebe’s criticism of Conrad and the recent decision by Britain’s exam board to ban a poem on knife crime by Carol Ann Duffy from the GCSE syllabus. Duffy’s riposte, in the form of a poem, also brings out a drawback to Achebe’s argument: where does one draw the line, since every author in history can probably be accused of being close-minded (and thus culpable of violence) in some way?
Wednesday, September 3, 2008
“You taught me language, and my profit on’t is I know how to curse”
[I thought this quote from Caliban - typically thought to be Shakespeare’s figure for the native – was kind of apt because cursing = a violence against language]
It seems to me that Fanon’s polemical chapter stands not only as an exposition on the physical violence endemic in colonialism; on a more meta level, it performs violence of another sort – the (re)writing of narrative with the intention of usurping existing ones.
I would particularly like to consider this violence of narrative in light of Sartre’s preface to Fanon’s book when it was first published in 1961. On a basic level, Fanon is writing back to Empire, retaliating in much the same way as the natives physically do in his text. What I find interesting, though, is the way in which he does it: he literally sets out a historical narrative, a semi-detached observation of the flow of events in the interaction between settler and native (which later evolve into the capitalist West and the Third World). It is a mode of narrative highly reminiscent of Marx and Engels - the opposition of dialectics, the progression of society from capitalist to Communist - and I think it is a deliberate move on Fanon’s part. Besides his clear socialist and anti-capitalist slant, he is hijacking the Marxist narrative of violent revolution, change, and historical progress and moulding it to fit the colonial context. These connotations would not have been lost on the Western audience. Sartre says: “Fanon is the first since Engels to bring the processes of history into the clear light of day” (13), and indeed by presenting his argument as “history” Fanon clearly places the days of settler-native in the past. Now is the time of change and native violence, the time when colonial narratives get rewritten or erased to prepare the way for the tabula rasa of the new nationalist narrative.(Again to quote Sartre: “…in the past we made history and now it is being made of us”.)
The idea of conflicting and rewriting narratives is not new – one could say it marked the ‘soft’ side of imperialism: rewriting the rules, the history, the understanding of the East to fit Western frames. This is clear in Passage to India, in which Adela’s original narrative of what happened in the Marabar caves clearly trumps whatever narrative Aziz or his lawyer can weave in his defence. Yet at the same time, what happens in the caves is immaterial; what matters is the divergence of narratives that Forster can give us, for in the end the micro-narratives of the text are woven into a macro one by Forster with India as his main narrative. Interestingly though, Forster’s India narrative is essentially an unknowable (to repeat the point from last week), empty one for him to fill, like a blank canvas for him to paint or the empty echo of ‘boum’.
I think it may be too reductionist to say that this is Forster’s way of still imposing a (white) master narrative on his text (despite the multi-faceted view he presents), but you could draw a parallel with what Sartre does in his preface. While he seems to be trying to take Fanon’s point of view, the fact that he feels he has to explain Fanon’s points and make an appeal to his Western brethren turns his preface into an enwrapping, paratextual narrative for a reader of Fanon’s text. Pick up the book and you are reading Fanon first filtered through Sartre, as Passage to India becomes India filtered through Forster.
However, my question is: is it only in the nature of colonial-colonised narratives to be violent? Or is narrative in itself violent in the sense that it can be rewritten, taken apart, re-angled? I think modernism emphasizes this point best in the way that it fragments narrative (a form of violence against the unitary narrative) and breaks it up; in the same way, then, perhaps Fanon’s opposition and fragmentation of Western/historical narrative makes it deeply modernist – in spirit if not in form.
It seems to me that Fanon’s polemical chapter stands not only as an exposition on the physical violence endemic in colonialism; on a more meta level, it performs violence of another sort – the (re)writing of narrative with the intention of usurping existing ones.
I would particularly like to consider this violence of narrative in light of Sartre’s preface to Fanon’s book when it was first published in 1961. On a basic level, Fanon is writing back to Empire, retaliating in much the same way as the natives physically do in his text. What I find interesting, though, is the way in which he does it: he literally sets out a historical narrative, a semi-detached observation of the flow of events in the interaction between settler and native (which later evolve into the capitalist West and the Third World). It is a mode of narrative highly reminiscent of Marx and Engels - the opposition of dialectics, the progression of society from capitalist to Communist - and I think it is a deliberate move on Fanon’s part. Besides his clear socialist and anti-capitalist slant, he is hijacking the Marxist narrative of violent revolution, change, and historical progress and moulding it to fit the colonial context. These connotations would not have been lost on the Western audience. Sartre says: “Fanon is the first since Engels to bring the processes of history into the clear light of day” (13), and indeed by presenting his argument as “history” Fanon clearly places the days of settler-native in the past. Now is the time of change and native violence, the time when colonial narratives get rewritten or erased to prepare the way for the tabula rasa of the new nationalist narrative.(Again to quote Sartre: “…in the past we made history and now it is being made of us”.)
The idea of conflicting and rewriting narratives is not new – one could say it marked the ‘soft’ side of imperialism: rewriting the rules, the history, the understanding of the East to fit Western frames. This is clear in Passage to India, in which Adela’s original narrative of what happened in the Marabar caves clearly trumps whatever narrative Aziz or his lawyer can weave in his defence. Yet at the same time, what happens in the caves is immaterial; what matters is the divergence of narratives that Forster can give us, for in the end the micro-narratives of the text are woven into a macro one by Forster with India as his main narrative. Interestingly though, Forster’s India narrative is essentially an unknowable (to repeat the point from last week), empty one for him to fill, like a blank canvas for him to paint or the empty echo of ‘boum’.
I think it may be too reductionist to say that this is Forster’s way of still imposing a (white) master narrative on his text (despite the multi-faceted view he presents), but you could draw a parallel with what Sartre does in his preface. While he seems to be trying to take Fanon’s point of view, the fact that he feels he has to explain Fanon’s points and make an appeal to his Western brethren turns his preface into an enwrapping, paratextual narrative for a reader of Fanon’s text. Pick up the book and you are reading Fanon first filtered through Sartre, as Passage to India becomes India filtered through Forster.
However, my question is: is it only in the nature of colonial-colonised narratives to be violent? Or is narrative in itself violent in the sense that it can be rewritten, taken apart, re-angled? I think modernism emphasizes this point best in the way that it fragments narrative (a form of violence against the unitary narrative) and breaks it up; in the same way, then, perhaps Fanon’s opposition and fragmentation of Western/historical narrative makes it deeply modernist – in spirit if not in form.
Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Portrait of the Artist in India
A Passage to India fascinated me with its numerous references, both veiled and overt, to the figure of the artist producing art in both British and Indian contexts. This echoes, I feel, Forster’s own position as an artist trying to write the unknowable, subjective human consciousness – and more than that, the alien human - into his art. At the same time, he raises the question of the voice of the native artist: is there such a voice, as the Western artist understands the term?
In this way I guess you could see this novel as speaking in counterpoint to Gikandi’s rather damning account of the artistic interaction between West and East. Passage shows the complexity of this process; or rather, the struggle that Forster – bearing in mind his deeply humanistic (“only connect”) bent – faced in trying to connect, or create a literary passage, as it were, to India.
On the one hand, Forster seems to be saying that in this age of empire and modernity when contact with the East is inevitable, it is pointless and in fact ossifying to keep up the pretence of clearly demarcated boundaries between pure Western art and the influence of the East. A clear example of this is the faintly ludicrous affair of staging Cousin Kate with the British sweating it out manfully in order to keep the “windows…barred, lest the servants should see their memsahibs acting” (17, Penguin edition).
However, this doesn’t mean that Forster is all for placing India (in every sense of the word as a semiotic and artistic cipher) on an equal pedestal as the West; through his descriptions of India/ns vs the West (an observation: Forster tends to like to set up East-West comparisons in his expository sections, as in this passage that I found very poetic, notwithstanding: “In Europe life retreats out of the cold, and exquisite fireside myths have resulted—Balder, Persephone—but here the retreat is from the source of life, the treacherous sun, and no poetry adorns it because disillusionment cannot be beautiful”), the overwhelming impression one gets is that Indian art is still inferior to Western because it is formless; formless in the sense that Forster’s India is depicted as so mercurial and volatile – as in Aziz’s quick change of moods, the many faces of the Marabar Caves – and ultimately shapeless. And to Forster’s European mind, form is the measure of aestheticism – to quote Fielding as he leaves India: “He had forgotten the beauty of form among idol temples and lumpy hills; indeed, without form, how can there be beauty?” (250) In fact, to continue the earlier quote comparing Europe and India: “Men yearn for poetry though they may not confess it; they desire that joy shall be graceful and sorrow august and infinity have a form, and India fails to accommodate them."
Yet one can say that India appears formless to Forster because it eludes his grasp. Just as Indian society cannot be reduced to the colonizer’s classifying gaze (as Levine discusses), Forster cannot truly understand the mindset of the Indian artist and Indian art, even when these make use of European elements. I am thinking here of transmutation, of the native breaking down and appropriating European symbols for their own use, as when Mrs Moore’s name is transmuted into the chant and cause of Esmiss Esmoor, or the Indians’ raucous celebration of “God si Love”. Subversively, this breaks the form of European-ness and reshapes it according to Indian form, and in so doing Othering it to the Western mind.
More than that, ‘native’ Indian art resists the understanding of the Western mind. Godbole’s song of the milkmaid (as Xinwei has pointed out) and Aziz’s Persian poetry at the end of the novel can be read as examples of the Indian artist’s voice, evading Western comprehension. The deeper metaphysical implications of incomprehensibility are evident in the “ou-boum” echo of the caves: frightening, even shocking the Western mind out of its comfort zone. (Did anyone else see a similarity between “ou-boum” and Kurtz’s cryptic “the horror, the horror” in Heart of Darkness?)
As a closing thought on Forster’s quandary of how to deal with the Other in art, Godbole’s song also brought to mind Forster’s posthumously-published novel Maurice. In that novel, the protagonist makes a similar plea of “Come!” to the night; and since it is set in Forster’s artistic comfort zone (in terms of country and class), he is able to tie the novel’s ends together neatly – Maurice’s lover comes, and he is able to give the artist’s gift of a (somewhat) happy ending to the couple. Western artifice triumphs.
In Passage, however, Godbole says, “I say to Him, Come, come, come, come, come, come. He neglects to come.” (68) And indeed the mystery of the heart of the book remains – Forster has to end the book on an uneasy note: ne’er East nor West shall meet in unity, “no, not yet..no, not there.”
In this way I guess you could see this novel as speaking in counterpoint to Gikandi’s rather damning account of the artistic interaction between West and East. Passage shows the complexity of this process; or rather, the struggle that Forster – bearing in mind his deeply humanistic (“only connect”) bent – faced in trying to connect, or create a literary passage, as it were, to India.
On the one hand, Forster seems to be saying that in this age of empire and modernity when contact with the East is inevitable, it is pointless and in fact ossifying to keep up the pretence of clearly demarcated boundaries between pure Western art and the influence of the East. A clear example of this is the faintly ludicrous affair of staging Cousin Kate with the British sweating it out manfully in order to keep the “windows…barred, lest the servants should see their memsahibs acting” (17, Penguin edition).
However, this doesn’t mean that Forster is all for placing India (in every sense of the word as a semiotic and artistic cipher) on an equal pedestal as the West; through his descriptions of India/ns vs the West (an observation: Forster tends to like to set up East-West comparisons in his expository sections, as in this passage that I found very poetic, notwithstanding: “In Europe life retreats out of the cold, and exquisite fireside myths have resulted—Balder, Persephone—but here the retreat is from the source of life, the treacherous sun, and no poetry adorns it because disillusionment cannot be beautiful”), the overwhelming impression one gets is that Indian art is still inferior to Western because it is formless; formless in the sense that Forster’s India is depicted as so mercurial and volatile – as in Aziz’s quick change of moods, the many faces of the Marabar Caves – and ultimately shapeless. And to Forster’s European mind, form is the measure of aestheticism – to quote Fielding as he leaves India: “He had forgotten the beauty of form among idol temples and lumpy hills; indeed, without form, how can there be beauty?” (250) In fact, to continue the earlier quote comparing Europe and India: “Men yearn for poetry though they may not confess it; they desire that joy shall be graceful and sorrow august and infinity have a form, and India fails to accommodate them."
Yet one can say that India appears formless to Forster because it eludes his grasp. Just as Indian society cannot be reduced to the colonizer’s classifying gaze (as Levine discusses), Forster cannot truly understand the mindset of the Indian artist and Indian art, even when these make use of European elements. I am thinking here of transmutation, of the native breaking down and appropriating European symbols for their own use, as when Mrs Moore’s name is transmuted into the chant and cause of Esmiss Esmoor, or the Indians’ raucous celebration of “God si Love”. Subversively, this breaks the form of European-ness and reshapes it according to Indian form, and in so doing Othering it to the Western mind.
More than that, ‘native’ Indian art resists the understanding of the Western mind. Godbole’s song of the milkmaid (as Xinwei has pointed out) and Aziz’s Persian poetry at the end of the novel can be read as examples of the Indian artist’s voice, evading Western comprehension. The deeper metaphysical implications of incomprehensibility are evident in the “ou-boum” echo of the caves: frightening, even shocking the Western mind out of its comfort zone. (Did anyone else see a similarity between “ou-boum” and Kurtz’s cryptic “the horror, the horror” in Heart of Darkness?)
As a closing thought on Forster’s quandary of how to deal with the Other in art, Godbole’s song also brought to mind Forster’s posthumously-published novel Maurice. In that novel, the protagonist makes a similar plea of “Come!” to the night; and since it is set in Forster’s artistic comfort zone (in terms of country and class), he is able to tie the novel’s ends together neatly – Maurice’s lover comes, and he is able to give the artist’s gift of a (somewhat) happy ending to the couple. Western artifice triumphs.
In Passage, however, Godbole says, “I say to Him, Come, come, come, come, come, come. He neglects to come.” (68) And indeed the mystery of the heart of the book remains – Forster has to end the book on an uneasy note: ne’er East nor West shall meet in unity, “no, not yet..no, not there.”
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Modernism's Mirror
I'd like to use the following quote from the Auerbach reading as a springboard for the rest of this post:
"The writer as narrator of objective facts has almost completely vanished; almost everything stated appears by way of reflection in the consciousness of the dramatis personae." (534)
The motif of reflection/mirroring seems particularly pertinent to the issues raised by Auerbach and Gikandi: firstly in how mirroring as a means of constructing the self appears to be a trait (or product?) of modernism. I say this based not only on Woolf’s technique of using the random external event to reflect the inner self (538) and Gikandi’s argument of how Picasso uses the African art object to isolate the “pure” forms of Western art; Auerbach’s own method of explication - reflecting the stylistics of modernist fiction off (an)other text – bears this out as well. Of course, one can give a pat explanation for this trait: the destabilizing of the central, unitary self that accompanied the modernist movement (as Auerbach says several times) means that identity can only be asserted in relation (or reflection) to another, or an external circumstance. However, I would argue that this method of mirroring comes with its own problematic set of double standards, as it were.
It seems to me that we can read Gikandi’s argument as providing the underside to what is generally considered innovative and pathbreaking about modernism. One such feature: the external and mundane serving as a mirror/catalyst for the richer inner world. Here’s what Auerbach has to say about it:
“in Virginia Woolf’s case the exterior events have actually lost their hegemony, they serve to release and interpret inner events…” (538)
Besides the striking choice of the word “hegemony” - with its connotations of power relations - here, I can’t help but see a parallel between this and Gikandi’s argument. The external, or the African/Other (bearing in mind the common technique of relegating the Other to the margin), is not considered in and of itself but in how it sheds light on the internal/central self.
At the same time, both Woolf and Auerbach both employ the technique of extrapolation: using something small (a brown stocking, a short extract from To the Lighthouse, a madeleine..sorry Proust) to derive larger conclusions. Yet how is this different from what Gikandi accuses Picasso and other Primitivists of doing – fetishizing and using a part of African culture (like the mask) as sufficient representation of the whole?
I guess it’s hard to think of such questions without bringing in value judgments – Auerbach was right when he said that this was “indicative…of certain tendencies and needs on the part of both authors and public” (546). Yet my question is: is it possible to conceive of the self without a mirror? We are used to thinking in dichotomies, I think - even the module title seems to be setting up a sort of self-other divide…but how else can we think of one without the other?
- Andrea
"The writer as narrator of objective facts has almost completely vanished; almost everything stated appears by way of reflection in the consciousness of the dramatis personae." (534)
The motif of reflection/mirroring seems particularly pertinent to the issues raised by Auerbach and Gikandi: firstly in how mirroring as a means of constructing the self appears to be a trait (or product?) of modernism. I say this based not only on Woolf’s technique of using the random external event to reflect the inner self (538) and Gikandi’s argument of how Picasso uses the African art object to isolate the “pure” forms of Western art; Auerbach’s own method of explication - reflecting the stylistics of modernist fiction off (an)other text – bears this out as well. Of course, one can give a pat explanation for this trait: the destabilizing of the central, unitary self that accompanied the modernist movement (as Auerbach says several times) means that identity can only be asserted in relation (or reflection) to another, or an external circumstance. However, I would argue that this method of mirroring comes with its own problematic set of double standards, as it were.
It seems to me that we can read Gikandi’s argument as providing the underside to what is generally considered innovative and pathbreaking about modernism. One such feature: the external and mundane serving as a mirror/catalyst for the richer inner world. Here’s what Auerbach has to say about it:
“in Virginia Woolf’s case the exterior events have actually lost their hegemony, they serve to release and interpret inner events…” (538)
Besides the striking choice of the word “hegemony” - with its connotations of power relations - here, I can’t help but see a parallel between this and Gikandi’s argument. The external, or the African/Other (bearing in mind the common technique of relegating the Other to the margin), is not considered in and of itself but in how it sheds light on the internal/central self.
At the same time, both Woolf and Auerbach both employ the technique of extrapolation: using something small (a brown stocking, a short extract from To the Lighthouse, a madeleine..sorry Proust) to derive larger conclusions. Yet how is this different from what Gikandi accuses Picasso and other Primitivists of doing – fetishizing and using a part of African culture (like the mask) as sufficient representation of the whole?
I guess it’s hard to think of such questions without bringing in value judgments – Auerbach was right when he said that this was “indicative…of certain tendencies and needs on the part of both authors and public” (546). Yet my question is: is it possible to conceive of the self without a mirror? We are used to thinking in dichotomies, I think - even the module title seems to be setting up a sort of self-other divide…but how else can we think of one without the other?
- Andrea
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